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[431] 
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE SHADOW OF STATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS LAWS: A CASE STUDY 
BY 
ALEXANDRA B. KLASS* 
This Article looks at the relationship between state environmental 
rights statutes and the common law public trust doctrine. In addressing this 
issue, it focuses on the state of Minnesota, where, in the early 1970s, the 
state legislature enacted a far-reaching environmental rights statute, the 
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), that served to codify many 
public trust principles. Beginning in the early 1970s and for the next forty 
years, litigants in Minnesota that might otherwise have brought common law 
public trust doctrine claims for environmental protection purposes instead 
channeled that litigation through MERA. As a result, Minnesota courts have 
rarely been asked to interpret or use the common law public trust doctrine 
at all in the context of environmental protection. And, more importantly, 
they did not have an opportunity to use and develop the doctrine during the 
time the environmental protection movement was at its height in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Instead, the lyrical language many courts used in public 
trust doctrine cases in other states during that era to protect natural 
resources and expand the scope of the doctrine is found, in Minnesota, in 
MERA cases, not in public trust doctrine cases. This Article explores the 
implications of the underuse of the common law public trust doctrine in 
Minnesota by focusing on a 2012 case, White Bear Lake Restoration 
Association v. Department of Natural Resources, which is the first case to 
begin a new conversation on the common law public trust doctrine in the 
state—one that never took place in the 1970s. This case involves traditional 
public trust resources—a lake and a lakebed—as well as efforts by private 
citizens to compel the state to protect those resources for present and future 
generations, thus coming squarely within the purview of MERA and even the 
most narrow reading of the public trust doctrine. The state argued in part 
that MERA had replaced the common law public trust doctrine in Minnesota 
	
* Distinguished McKnight University Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I received 
very helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article from Robin Craig, John Echeverria, 
Robert Glicksman, Richard Lazarus, Nathaniel Moore, Kevin Reuther, Melissa Scanlan, Byron 
Starns, and Matthew Seltzer. Professor Klass was a consultant to the attorneys for the plaintiff 
White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Association in White Bear Lake Restoration Association v. 
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources. The views expressed in this Article are those 
solely of Professor Klass and not of White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Association or their 
attorneys. 
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and that the doctrine on its own could not be used for environmental 
protection purposes, citing the lack of any relevant public trust doctrine 
cases. While the district court rejected these contentions, the arguments of 
the parties and the court’s analysis sheds light on the important relationship 
between the common law and state legislation in the context of public trust 
resources and environmental protection. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1970s and early 1980s were heady times for environmental law and 
its supporters. Congress enacted the most sweeping federal protections for 
natural resources, human health, and the environment ever seen then or 
since in the form of the Clean Air Act,1 the Clean Water Act,2 and a host of 
other federal statutes. President Nixon created the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).3 There was a national conversation about the need 
to preserve natural resources and protect human health, even if it placed 
new and significant limits on industrial activities as well as commercial and 
residential development. At the same time, a similar conversation and 
related legal developments were taking place in state legislatures. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s many states enacted new laws to protect air, water, 
and open space that built on the new federal environmental laws and 
created new state agencies to administer them.4 
But there was another, related conversation occurring in academia and, 
ultimately, in the state courts over a different approach to protecting natural 
resources—the use of the public trust doctrine. The public trust doctrine is 
an ancient Roman law doctrine which provides that states must hold certain 
natural resources, particularly submerged lands under tidal and navigable 
	
 1  42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
 2  Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
 3  5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2012). 
 4  See, e.g., Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice 
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 578–85 (2001) (describing state environmental protection 
legislation from the pre-1970 era through the 1990s). 
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waters, in trust for the use and benefit of the public and future generations.5 
Prior to 1970, U.S. courts limited application of the doctrine primarily to 
cases involving efforts to preserve public access to water resources for 
commerce, recreation, transportation, and fishing.6 In 1970, however, Joseph 
Sax argued in an influential law review article that the public trust doctrine 
could be an alternative and complementary means of forcing state agency 
officials to protect natural resources even when strong environmental 
protection legislation did not require such action or provide standing to 
those who wished to protect natural resources.7 Environmental groups and 
individuals took up the call to arms and convinced courts in many states to 
adopt a more expansive use of the public trust doctrine to protect a broad 
range of natural resources. Excellent legal scholarship has catalogued the 
number and range of cases over the years and serves to emphasize just how 
important a role the common law public trust doctrine has become in the 
past several decades.8 
The rise of environmental protection statutes coupled with the 
increasing use of the public trust doctrine led to yet another strand of legal 
developments that combined the legislative and common law advances. 
First, several states amended their constitutions in the 1970s and included 
provisions declaring that the citizens of the state have the right to clean air, 
pure water, and the preservation of natural resources; these provisions also 
declare that the government has an obligation to protect those resources for 
its citizens and future generations.9 Second, Professor Sax worked with the 
Michigan legislature to create an environmental rights statute, the Michigan 
Environmental Protection Act,10 that grants private citizens the right to sue 
the government and other private parties to ensure the protection of natural 
resources even where other substantive environmental protection statutes 
did not provide such a right of action.11 A few other states followed suit, 
most notably Minnesota, which in 1971 enacted the Minnesota 
Environmental Rights Act (MERA).12 Modeled after the Michigan statute, 
MERA grants any private party, state, or local government the right to sue 
for declaratory or injunctive relief to protect air, water, land, or other natural 
	
 5  See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970) (summarizing the history of the public trust 
doctrine). 
 6  See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (stating that the scope of the 
public trust doctrine was traditionally defined in terms of navigation, commerce, and fisheries 
but also noting that the doctrine is sufficiently flexible “to encompass changing needs”). 
 7  Sax, supra note 5. 
 8  MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW xxi–xxx (2013) (table of secondary sources 
listing approximately 200 scholarly articles on the public trust doctrine). 
 9  See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and 
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 714–15 (2006). 
 10  Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of 1970, 1970 
Mich. Pub. Act 127, repealed by 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 451. Today the Michigan Environmental 
Protection Act is codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 324.1701–.1706 (West 2012). 
 11  See Klass, supra note 9, at 721.  
 12  MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01–13 (2014). 
12_TO JCI.KLASS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  2:52 PM 
434 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:431 
resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction.13 Even more than the 
Michigan statute, litigants in Minnesota have successfully used MERA to 
protect a broad range of natural resources, and to enjoin or limit a 
significant number of industrial, commercial, and residential development 
activities that would adversely impact protected natural resources.14 While 
other states enacted environmental rights statutes in the 1970s, very few 
have resulted in any significant case law and none as extensive as that in 
Minnesota.15 
The question for this Article is one that, to my knowledge, has not been 
addressed in the extensive literature on the public trust doctrine. The 
question is whether environmental rights statutes can stunt the growth of 
the common law public trust doctrine and how this can be avoided if, in fact, 
it should be avoided. While there may not be easy answers to this question, a 
recent case in Minnesota provides some helpful insights into what happens 
to the common law public trust doctrine when forty years of environmental 
litigation that would otherwise rely on the public trust doctrine is instead 
channeled into a fairly robust environmental rights statute. At least in 
Minnesota, the courts were not asked to interpret or use the public trust 
doctrine at all in the context of environmental protection.16 And, more 
importantly, they were not asked to use and develop the doctrine during the 
time the environmental protection movement was at its height—in the 1970s 
and early 1980s.17 During this era, courts in other states used the public trust 
doctrine to protect natural resources and gradually expanded the scope of 
that doctrine, while Minnesota courts used MERA to increase protection for 
environmental resources instead of strengthening the public trust doctrine. 
In fact, there are very few public trust doctrine cases involving 
environmental protection to be found in the state after 1970—an oddity 
considering the state’s history of strong environmental protection in other 
areas such as its enactment of MERA, the courts’ early expansive 
interpretation of that law, and the enactment of other 1970s-era 
environmental protection laws. 
However, in 2012, a Minnesota case, White Bear Lake Restoration 
Association v. Department of Natural Resources (White Bear Lake 
Restoration Association),18 began a new conversation on the public trust 
doctrine in the state—one that never took place in the 1970s. This case 
involves traditional public trust resources—a lake and a lakebed—as well as 
efforts by private citizens to compel the state to protect those resources for 
present and future generations, thus coming squarely within the purview of 
	
 13  Id. § 116B.01. 
 14  See Klass, supra note 9, at 722–24 (comparing case law in Minnesota and Michigan). 
 15  See id. at 725 (summarizing the law in states with similar statutes). 
 16  Id. at 713. 
 17  Id. at 706–07. 
 18  Settlement Agreement, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 
No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 16, 2014).  
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MERA and even the most narrow reading of the public trust doctrine.19 The 
state argued in part that MERA had replaced the common law public trust 
doctrine in Minnesota and that the doctrine on its own could not be used for 
environmental protection purposes, citing the lack of any relevant public 
trust doctrine cases.20 While the district court rejected these contentions,21 
the arguments of the parties and the court’s analysis sheds light on the 
important relationship between the common law and state legislation in the 
context of public trust resources and environmental protection more 
generally. 
Part II of this Article provides a brief history of the common law public 
trust doctrine, its expansion to more broadly protect natural resources in the 
1970s, and its role in creating the constitutional and statutory environmental 
rights provisions that exist in some states, including Minnesota, today. Part 
III explores MERA and the White Bear Lake Restoration Association case in 
detail to show how the channeling of environmental protection litigation 
toward MERA for forty years created a situation where there is very little 
public trust doctrine case law to rely on in the state. 
Part IV considers the implications of this lack of case law surrounding 
the public trust doctrine in Minnesota. Even if MERA does not displace the 
common law public trust doctrine in Minnesota, is it an adequate substitute? 
If a statute exists, is there a need for the common law doctrine? This Part 
contends that the common law public trust doctrine remains important 
despite the existence of MERA. First, the public trust doctrine has an 
important role in natural resource protection in the state because of various 
exemptions and affirmative defenses in the statute. Second, the public trust 
doctrine provides an important defense to regulatory takings claims when 
governmental entities act to protect natural resources in a manner that 
conflicts with private property rights. MERA cannot provide this support for 
state action and the public trust doctrine has a long history of playing just 
such a role. Third, and perhaps most important, the public trust doctrine 
remains important as an ultimate check on legislative and executive branch 
authority in the context of natural resources protection. Legislatures can 
amend statutes to provide less protection for natural resources. And courts 
must give deference under administrative law principles to agencies 
interpreting statutes and regulations, and that deference may result in 
	
 19  See Complaint at 6, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Apr. 10, 
2013). See also infra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (describing scope of the traditional 
public trust doctrine); infra notes 61–79 (describing scope of MERA). 
 20  See Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 17, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (May 1, 2014); 
Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 
23–24, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Apr. 7, 2014).  
 21  See Summary Judgment Order Memorandum at 17, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, 
No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Aug. 29, 2014) (rejecting the state’s arguments and granting summary 
judgment to Homeowners’ Association regarding whether the public trust doctrine affords a 
common law cause of action). 
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reduced protection for natural resources.22 But the public trust doctrine is a 
vehicle for the courts to ensure that the state fulfills its common law 
obligation to protect natural resources even if legislative and executive 
branch sentiments are otherwise.23 
Notably, in focusing on the relationship between MERA and the 
common law public trust doctrine in Minnesota, the goal of this Article is not 
at all to criticize MERA or to argue that litigants should ignore it in favor of 
bringing common law public trust doctrine claims. To the contrary, the 
Minnesota legislature in 1971 enacted powerful, far-reaching, and thoughtful 
legislation that has played a major role in protecting natural resources in the 
state since that time. The legislature also included a strong savings clause to 
ensure that MERA did not replace existing legal rights and remedies, 
including common law rights and remedies then in existence or that might 
develop in the future.24 Instead, the goal in this Article is to explore how the 
case law has developed in Minnesota and to encourage litigants in future 
cases to use the common law in efforts to protect the environment so a more 
robust common law jurisprudence can develop alongside judicial decisions 
interpreting MERA. 
In a 1986 article on the public trust doctrine, Professor Richard Lazarus 
warned environmental protection advocates and scholars not to place too 
much emphasis on the common law public trust doctrine lest it undermine 
efforts to create new natural resource protection frameworks through 
legislative and regulatory action.25 This was good advice at the time, when 
federal and state agencies and courts were in the process of creating a 
massive body of new regulations and case law interpreting and expanding 
the new environmental protection statutes enacted in the 1970s. And it may 
well remain good advice today. But the problem also exists in reverse. Too 
much emphasis on statutes can cause the common law to stagnate, and this 
can be particularly problematic if it happens at a critical time in history, 
when courts are in the process of developing a new rhetoric surrounding the 
protection of natural resources and the relationship between humans and 
the environment. As shown below, this appears to be what happened in 
Minnesota, particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, the Minnesota 
experience with the public trust doctrine is in some ways a cautionary tale. 
But, as the White Bear Lake Restoration Association litigation illustrates, the 
	
 22  See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.”); see also Mark 
A. Latham, (Un)Restoring the Chemical, Physical, and Biological Integrity of Our Nation’s 
Waters: The Emerging Clean Water Act Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
411, 447 (2010) (arguing that the modern Supreme Court has used the concept of administrative 
deference “as a sword to limit environmental protection”). 
 23  See, e.g., Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View 
into the Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 131 (2012) (discussing states’ obligations under 
the public trust doctrine). 
 24  Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.12 (West 2014). 
 25  Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 674–76 (1986). 
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problem can be partially if not completely remedied through good lawyering 
and courts recognizing that statutes can inform but do not replace common 
law doctrine when it comes to natural resource protection. 
II. THE MODERN PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES 
The public trust doctrine is an ancient Roman law doctrine that 
provides that states must hold certain natural resources, most notably 
submerged lands under tidal and navigable waters, in trust for the use and 
benefit of the public and future generations.26 Along those lines, the U.S. 
Supreme Court first articulated the parameters of the public trust doctrine in 
1892, in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois (Illinois Central).27 In 
that case, the Court held that the Illinois legislature did not possess the 
authority to sell over 1,000 acres underlying Lake Michigan in the Chicago 
Harbor to the Illinois Central Railroad because these submerged lands were 
owned under a “title held in trust for the people of the State that they may 
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have 
liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private 
parties.”28 Although the state could allow some private economic use of such 
lands, the uses must be ones that “do not substantially impair the public 
interest in the lands and waters remaining.”29 The Court stressed that the title 
to these lands was “different in character” from other state lands which 
could be sold into private ownership and also different than “the title which 
the United States holds in the public lands which are open to preemption 
and sale.”30 
U.S. courts generally limited application of the public trust doctrine to 
submerged lands under navigable waters for the decades that followed, but 
that began to change in the 1970s. In a very influential law review article 
written in 1970, Joseph Sax, at that time a Professor at the University of 
Michigan Law School, argued that the public trust doctrine could be a 
vehicle to compel state and local governments to protect water and other 
natural resources from development and other threats.31 Since that time, 
many state courts such as those in California, Hawaii, New York, and 
Louisiana have developed a robust common law public trust doctrine for a 
broad range of environmental protection purposes,32 while most other states 
have at least used the doctrine as a check on government or private action 
	
 26  Sax, supra note 5, at 475. 
 27  146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). 
 28  Id. at 452. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id.  
 31  Sax, supra note 5, at 473–74. 
 32  Klass, supra note 9, at 735 (discussing broad application of the public trust doctrine in 
Hawaii); see infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (describing public trust doctrine cases in 
California, Louisiana, and New York). 
12_TO JCI.KLASS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015  2:52 PM 
438 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:431 
that would limit public access to shoreline, fishing, or other commercial or 
recreational water-based resources.33 
For instance, the California courts have found that the common law 
public trust doctrine requires government regulators to take into account the 
impacts of surface water withdrawals that harm lakes; wind turbines that 
may kill raptors such as eagles, hawks, and falcons; and groundwater 
withdrawals that adversely impact connected surface waters.34 In Louisiana, 
courts have used the doctrine to limit the construction and operation of a 
hazardous waste disposal facility in addition to using it to protect more 
traditional public trust resources such as oyster beds.35 In New York, courts 
have held that the doctrine protects parkland in addition to traditional 
water-based resources.36 With regard to water-based resources, in the face of 
rapidly depleting surface and groundwater resources in many parts of the 
country, litigants have used the public trust doctrine successfully to place 
limits on state agencies that would otherwise continue to grant water 
appropriation permits to private developers and local governments.37 While 
the California Supreme Court’s famous Mono Lake case in 1983 may be the 
most well-known use of the public trust doctrine for this purpose,38 there 
	
 33  See generally Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust 
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENV. L. 
REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Eastern Comparative Guide]; Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to 
the Western Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State 
Summaries, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) [hereinafter Western Comparative Guide]. 
 34  See Nat’l Audobon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 711–12 (Cal. 1983); Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity v. FPL Group, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Holly Doremus, 
Groundwater and the Public Trust Doctrine, California Style, LEGAL PLANET, July 21, 2014, 
http://legal-planet.org/2014/07/21/groundwater-and-the-public-trust-doctrine-california-style/ 
(reporting on California trial court decision in July 2014 holding that groundwater pumping that 
affects flows in a navigable stream are subject to the public trust doctrine). 
 35 See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1159–60 (La. 1984) 
(recognizing that that the public trust doctrine imposes a duty on state actors to provide 
meaningful review of the impact of their decisions on natural resources and the environment); 
Ryan M. Seidemann, The Public Trust Doctrine and Surface Water Management and 
Conservation: A View from Louisiana, 40th Annual Conference on Environmental Law, 
American Bar Association—Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources (Mar. 18, 2011). 
(discussing potential impacts of public trust doctrine on development of shale resources in 
Louisiana). 
 36  See, e.g., Matter of Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 31145/056 (Dec. 20, 
2013) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and holding that development of a 
composting facility in a park violates the common law public trust doctrine and citing earlier 
similar cases). 
 37  See Doremus, supra note 34 (detailing the California trial court decision that 
groundwater removals affecting flows in a navigable stream are subject to the public trust 
doctrine); see also Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Dept. of Natural Res., 799 N.W.2d 73, 92 (Wis. 
2011) (holding that the state Department of Natural Resources was required to consider 
environmental impact of a proposed high-capacity well under the public trust doctrine when 
presented with sufficient potential harm to waters of the state). 
 38  See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983) (“The public trust 
doctrine serves the function in that integrated system of preserving the continuing sovereign 
power of the state to protect public trust uses . . . .”). 
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have been high-profile cases decided in more recent years in California, 
Wisconsin, and other states.39 
Excellent journal articles and books in recent years have detailed the 
use and expansion of the public trust doctrine for environmental protection 
purposes in all fifty states.40 This writing illustrates how litigants have now 
used the public trust doctrine for over four decades in efforts to protect 
traditional water-based resources as well as, in some states, public lands, 
parks, shoreland and beaches, the atmosphere, animals, and plant species.41 
However, it is important to keep in mind that in the majority of states, the 
public trust doctrine remains limited to navigable waters and submerged 
lands and has not been extended beyond access to and use of those 
resources.42 
Notably, the modern public trust doctrine does more than simply place 
limits on governmental action or inaction with regard to protected public 
trust resources. Instead, courts in many states have also relied on the public 
trust doctrine to support government actions to protect the environment by 
refusing to grant a permit or enacting new regulations to limit development 
that will harm natural resources.43 In this category of cases, instead of a 
plaintiff suing the government for violation of the public trust doctrine, a 
private party is suing the government for a “taking” of private property 
without just compensation or for acting in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner, and the governmental entity argues, often successfully, that the 
property in question is subject to and thus limited by the public trust 
doctrine.44 
The expansion and use of the common law public trust doctrine has 
influenced more than just common law doctrine. Also in the 1970s, many 
states amended their constitutions, adding public trust language. For 
instance, in 1971, Pennsylvania amended its state constitution to provide: 
 The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of 
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. 
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the 
	
 39  See Scanlan, supra note 23, at 139 (detailing the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lake Buelah Mgmt. Dist.); BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 8, at 165–77; see also Lake Beulah Mgmt. 
Dist., 799 N.W.2d at 92.  
 40  See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 8, at xxi–xxx (table of secondary sources listing 
approximately 200 scholarly articles on the public trust doctrine). 
 41  See id.; Craig, Eastern Comparative Guide, supra note 33; Craig, Western Comparative 
Guide, supra note 33; see also BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 8, at 349–56 (discussing lawsuits 
urging courts to include the atmosphere as a public trust resource in order to address climate 
change); see infra text accompanying note 100 (discussing Our Children’s Trust lawsuit in 
Minnesota). 
 42  Western Comparative Guide, supra note 33, at 56 (explaining the public trust doctrine 
“outlines public and private rights in water and submerged lands”); Eastern Comparative Guide, 
supra note 33, at 4 (same). 
 43  See Klass, supra note 9, at 734–42 (discussing cases in various states where courts 
upheld state or local regulatory action in the face of takings claims and other challenges based 
in whole or in part on the public trust doctrine). 
 44  Id. 
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people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the 
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the 
people.45 
It was this constitutional provision that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court relied upon in 2013 to strike down a state statute preventing local 
governments from limiting hydraulic fracturing activities within their 
jurisdictions.46 
Likewise, Montana amended its constitution in 1974 and included 
provisions that granted an “inalienable” right to a “clean and healthful 
environment” and placed a duty on the state and private parties to “maintain 
and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and 
future generations.”47 Montana courts have relied on these constitutional 
provisions to hold that a nonprofit group could sue the state environmental 
agency and a mining company to prevent discharge of contaminants to a 
river that would adversely impact water quality and species, even though the 
agency’s rules allowed the discharge.48 
A few state legislatures also enacted new laws beginning in the 1970s 
reflecting developing common law public trust principles.49 In Michigan, 
Professor Sax worked with the Michigan legislature to draft the Michigan 
Environmental Protection Act.50 According to Sax, the law had three 
purposes: 1) creating an enforceable legal right held by the public to a 
“decent environment”; 2) making that right “enforceable by private citizens” 
suing as members of the public; and 3) setting the groundwork for a 
“common law of environmental quality” by leaving the terms pollution, 
environmental quality, and public trust undefined to allow courts to develop 
a common law approach to the problem and create flexible solutions.51 
In 1971, the Minnesota legislature enacted MERA,52 modeled after the 
Michigan law, which gives any person the right to seek declaratory and 
injunctive relief in court against any person as necessary to “protect the air, 
water, land, or other natural resources” in the state whether publicly or 
privately owned from “pollution, impairment or destruction.”53 “Natural 
resources” include but are not limited to “all mineral, animal, botanical, air, 
water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and historical resources” as 
	
 45  PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 46  Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013). 
 47  MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; id. at art. IX, § 1. 
 48  Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249 (Mont. 1999). 
 49  See Klass, supra note 9, at 721–25 (discussing state environmental rights statutes); Susan 
George et al., The Public in Action: Using State Citizen Suit Statutes to Protect Biodiversity, 6 U. 
BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 14–20 & app. A (1997) (summarizing environmental rights statutes). 
 50  Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.1701–.1706 (West 
2012); Klass, supra note 9, at 721. 
 51  JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN ACTION 248 
(1972). 
 52  Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01–.13 (West 2014). 
 53  Id. § 116B.07. 
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well as state-owned scenic and aesthetic resources.54 Minnesota courts have 
interpreted MERA broadly to protect birds, trees, historic buildings, marsh 
and wetland areas, quietude in residential areas, drinking water wells, 
wetlands, and the wilderness experience in forests.55 Litigants have used 
MERA successfully to enjoin actions by the state, local governments, and 
private parties that would harm the environment and to compel action to 
protect the environment.56 
By the late 1990s, approximately fifteen states had distinct 
environmental rights statutes—as opposed to citizen suit provisions to 
enforce various state environmental protection laws.57 However, only in 
Minnesota have courts regularly used the statute to protect natural 
resources beyond what state environmental protection laws already 
mandate.58 Indeed, even the Michigan statute on which MERA was modeled 
has not had as much success as MERA in creating a statutory vehicle to 
promote Sax’s vision for developing the common law public trust doctrine.59 
This is primarily because Michigan courts have been less generous on 
standing to sue than the Minnesota courts, thus defeating one of Sax’s main 
goals for the law.60 
III. THE MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT AND WHITE BEAR LAKE 
RESTORATION ASSOCIATION V. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
This Part explores MERA in more detail to show how it codifies various 
aspects of the public trust doctrine, expands on particular aspects of the 
doctrine, but also includes limits and defenses not found in the common law 
public trust doctrine. This Part then discusses the White Bear Lake 
Restoration Association case to provide a case study of what happens when 
a court is faced with a public trust doctrine claim to protect a traditional 
public trust doctrine resource—a lake—but has virtually no case law, 
positive or negative, to help resolve the claim. 
A. MERA and Cases Applying MERA 
As discussed in Part I, MERA is the most robust of the state 
environmental rights statutes enacted in the 1970s to provide a statutory 
vehicle to advance Professor Sax’s goals for the public trust doctrine. 
Indeed, the “purpose” section of MERA states: 
	
 54  Id. § 116B.02. 
 55  Klass, supra note 9, at 722. 
 56  Id. at 722–23.  
 57  Klass, supra note 9, at 725. 
 58  See Klass, supra note 9, at 722–25 (discussing limited application of state environmental 
rights statutes by the courts in states other than Minnesota); see also George et al., supra note 
49, at 16–20 (discussing judicial limitations placed on private rights of action, defendants 
subject to suit, and remedies in most of the states with environmental rights statutes). 
 59  Klass, supra note 9, at 723–25. 
 60  Id. at 723. 
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The legislature finds and declares that each person is entitled by right to 
the protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, and other 
natural resources located within the state and that each person has the 
responsibility to contribute to the protection, preservation, and enhancement 
thereof. The legislature further declares its policy to create and maintain 
within the state conditions under which human beings and nature can exist in 
productive harmony in order that present and future generations may enjoy 
clean air and water, productive land, and other natural resources with which 
this state has been endowed. Accordingly, it is in the public interest to provide 
an adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land and other natural resources 
located within the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction.61 
Section 116B.03 provides that any person may maintain a civil action in 
state district court for declaratory or injunctive relief in the name of the 
State of Minnesota against any person “for the protection of the air, water, 
land, or other natural resources located within the state, whether publicly or 
privately owned, from pollution, impairment, or destruction.”62 MERA 
defines “natural resources” as including but not limited to “all mineral, 
animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and 
historical resources,” as well as any “[s]cenic and esthetic resources . . . 
when owned by any governmental unit or agency.”63 MERA defines 
“pollution, impairment, or destruction” as 1) any conduct that “violates, or is 
likely to violate, any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, 
license, stipulation agreement, or permit of the state or any instrumentality, 
agency, or political subdivision thereof”; or 2) any conduct that “materially 
adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the 
environment.”64 With regard to determining what conduct “materially 
adversely affects” or “is likely to materially adversely affect” the 
environment, Minnesota courts apply a five-factor test adapted from a 
Michigan court interpreting its own environmental rights statute.65 The 
factors are: 
	
 61  Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 (West 2014). 
 62  Id. § 116B.03, subdiv. 1. MERA excludes family farms and family farm corporations from 
the definition of “persons” who can be sued under MERA. Id. § 116B.02, subdiv. 2. See also Cnty. 
of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 294–95 (Minn. 1973) for a discussion of the family farm 
exemption. Within seven days of filing suit, the plaintiff must serve the summons and complaint 
upon the state attorney general and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and, within 21 days 
of filing the suit, must publish written notice of the suit in a legal newspaper in the county in 
which the suit is commenced with information on the parties, date of suit, court, the acts 
complained of, and declaratory and injunctive relief requested. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03, 
subdiv. 2. In any MERA suit, the attorney general may intervene as a matter of right, and other 
interested parties may intervene upon permission of the court. Id. § 116B.03, subdiv. 3. 
 63  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02, subdiv. 4. 
 64  Id. § 116B.02. 
 65  Id. at subdiv. 5; Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1993) (explicitly incorporating multi-factor test from the Michigan Court of Appeals 
decision in City of Portage v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 355 N.W.2d 913, 915–16 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1984)). 
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(1) The quality and severity of any adverse effects of the proposed action on 
the natural resources affected; 
(2) Whether the natural resources affected are rare, unique, endangered, or 
have historical significance; 
(3) Whether the proposed action will have long-term adverse effects on natural 
resources, including whether the affected resources are easily replaceable (for 
example, by replanting trees or restocking fish); 
(4) Whether the proposed action will have significant consequential effects on 
other natural resources (for example, whether wildlife will be lost if its habitat 
is impaired or destroyed); 
(5) Whether the affected natural resources are significantly increasing or 
decreasing in number, considering the direct and consequential impact of the 
proposed action.66 
According to Minnesota courts, the factors are nonexclusive and an 
activity does not have to satisfy every factor to result in a materially adverse 
effect on the environment.67 Instead, the factors are intended as a “flexible 
guideline” based on the facts of each case.68 The courts have stated that use 
of the factors recognizes the reality that “[a]lmost every human activity has 
some kind of adverse impact on a natural resource” and that the purpose of 
MERA was not to prohibit “virtually all human enterprise.”69 
MERA goes on to provide in its “Burden of Proof” section that in any 
action alleging violation of an “environmental quality standard, limitation, 
rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit promulgated or issued 
by the Pollution Control Agency, Department of Natural Resources, 
Department of Health, or Department of Agriculture,” whenever the plaintiff 
makes a prima facie showing of a violation, the defendant may rebut that 
showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary.70 Likewise, in an 
action where the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s 
conduct is likely to “materially adversely affect the environment,” the 
defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of evidence 
to the contrary.71 However, in an action relying on a showing of “material 
adverse effect,” the defendant may also show as an affirmative defense that 
“there is no feasible and prudent alternative and the conduct at issue is 
consistent with and reasonably required for promotion of the public health, 
	
 66  Schaller v. Cnty. of Blue Earth, 563 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Minn. 1997) (affirming use of 
Michigan multi-factor test but modifying it for use in MERA cases). Schaller was recently 
reaffirmed by Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. A11-1725, 
2012 WL 2202984, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 18, 2012). 
 67  Schaller, 563 N.W.2d at 267. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. at 265 (alteration in original) (citing Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 
N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 70  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04. 
 71  Id. §§ 116B.02–116B.04. 
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safety, and welfare in light of the state’s paramount concern for the 
protection of its air, water, land and other natural resources from pollution, 
impairment, or destruction.”72 The statute expressly provides that 
“[e]conomic considerations alone shall not constitute a defense.”73 As a 
remedy in any MERA claim under section 116B.03, the court may grant 
“declaratory relief, temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may impose 
such conditions upon a party as are necessary or appropriate to protect the 
air, water, land or other natural resources located within the state from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction.”74 The statute does not provide for 
damages and does not include any provision for the court to award 
attorneys’ fees or expert fees to prevailing parties.75 
A separate provision of MERA, section 116B.10, provides that any 
person may maintain a civil action in the district court for declaratory or 
equitable relief against the state where the nature of the action is a challenge 
to an environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, license, 
stipulation agreement, or permit promulgated or issued by the state.76 In any 
such action the plaintiff must prove the existence of material evidence 
showing that the environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, 
license, stipulation agreement, or permit is inadequate to protect the air, 
water, land, or other natural resources located within the state from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction.77 If the plaintiff prevails under this 
section, the court does not issue a declaration or injunction as it does under 
section 116B.03, but instead remands the matter to the agency to make 
appropriate findings.78 
These provisions of MERA, taken together, give all state citizens the 
ability to challenge: 1) any action that violates or may violate state 
environmental permits, standards, or rules; 2) any state-issued 
environmental permits, standards, or rules that are inadequate to protect 
state natural resources; and 3) any actions that may materially adversely 
affect the environment where no state environmental standard, rule, or 
permit specifically prohibits or allows the action. Thus, MERA allows the 
courts to determine, separate and apart from the legislative branch, whether 
limits beyond existing environmental laws and standards should be placed 
on government or private actions that may result in pollution, impairment, or 
destruction of natural resources. 
Significantly, the Minnesota legislature did not intend MERA to preempt 
or displace any existing statutory or common law rights or remedies. MERA 
explicitly states that “[t]he rights and remedies provided herein shall be in 
	
 72  Id. § 116B.04. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. §§ 116B.03, 116B.07. 
 75  See id. § 116B.07. 
 76  Id. § 116B.10, subdiv. 1. 
 77  Id. § 116B.10, subdiv. 2. 
 78  Id. § 116B.10, subdiv. 3.  
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addition to any administrative, regulatory, statutory, or common law rights 
and remedies now or hereafter available.”79 
Since MERA’s enactment, courts have used it to protect a variety of 
natural resources, including birds and the trees they nest in, the view from a 
state forest and the wilderness experience in visiting the forest, quietude in 
residential areas, wetlands, drinking water wells, marshes, wildlife areas, 
and historic buildings.80 Courts have enjoined county highway projects, a 
gravel pit, a shooting range, a radio tower on private land, tree harvesting, 
and a jail, and have set a minimum lake level with an accompanying 
injunction for a county to repair a dam to ensure that level is achieved.81 
Notably, the language Minnesota courts used in early MERA cases 
closely resembles the language courts in other states used in early common 
law public trust doctrine cases to emphasize the importance of protecting 
natural resources threatened by development, thus reflecting the impact of 
the national environmental movement of the 1970s. For instance, in one of 
the first MERA cases, County of Freeborn v. Bryson (Bryson),82 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court enjoined a county from building a highway 
through a wetland on private property when the owner of the property 
challenged the county’s condemnation action.83 In the second of two 
opinions it issued in the case, the court stated: 
Times change. Until [MERA] was passed, the holder of the power of 
eminent domain had in its hands almost a legislative fiat to construct a 
highway wherever it wished. In the 1920’s and 1930’s, the state encouraged 
highway construction to facilitate industrial expansion and transportation of 
farm products to market. However, a consequence of such construction has 
been the elimination or impairment of natural resources. Whether for highways 
or for numerous other reasons, including agriculture, it is a well-known fact 
that marshes have been drained almost indiscriminately over the past 50 years, 
greatly reducing their numbers. The remaining resources will not be destroyed 
so indiscriminately because the law has been drastically changed by [MERA]. 
Since the legislature has determined that this change is necessary, it is the duty 
of the courts to support the legislative goal of protecting our environmental 
resources. 
. . . . 
To some of our citizens, a swamp or marshland is physically unattractive, 
an inconvenience to cross by foot and an obstacle to road construction or 
improvement. However, to an increasing number of our citizens who have 
become concerned enough about the vanishing wetlands to seek legislative 
	
 79  Id. § 116B.12. 
 80  Klass, supra note 9, at 722 (summarizing cases). 
 81  Id. at 722–23. See also Swan Lake Area Wildlife Ass’n v. Nicollet Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 771 N.W.2d 529, 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that the county violated MERA by 
allowing two wetlands to drain by failing to maintain a dam and stating that district court had 
jurisdiction to set a crest elevation for the dam to remedy the impairment of natural resources). 
 82  243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976). 
 83  Id. at 317. 
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relief, a swamp or marsh is a thing of beauty. To one who is willing to risk wet 
feet to walk through it, a marsh frequently contains a springy soft moss, 
vegetation of many varieties, and wildlife not normally seen on higher ground. 
It is quiet and peaceful—the most ancient of cathedrals—antedating the oldest 
of manmade structures. More than that, it acts as nature’s sponge, holding 
heavy moisture to prevent flooding during heavy rainfalls and slowly releasing 
the moisture and maintaining the water tables during dry cycles. In short, 
marshes and swamps are something to protect and preserve.84 
The court then quoted Aldo Leopold’s Sand County Almanac for the 
concept of a “land ethic”—that the individual is a member of a community 
with interdependent parts and that community includes soils, water, plants, 
animals, and collectively, the land.85 The court concluded by stating that in 
MERA, “our state legislature has given this land ethic the force of law. Our 
construction of the Act gives effect to this broad remedial purpose.”86 
The tone and language of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Bryson closely resembles some of the first modern public trust cases in the 
1970s from other parts of the country. For instance, in 1972, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court decided Just v. Marinette County,87 holding that a shoreland 
zoning ordinance that prohibited a landowner from filling wetlands 
connected to navigable waters was not a taking that required 
compensation.88 The court found that the state’s “active public trust duty” 
required the state to not only promote navigation but also preserve and 
protect wetlands and related water resources for fishing, recreation, and 
scenic beauty.89 The court stated: 
This case causes us to reexamine the concepts of public benefit in contrast 
to public harm and the scope of an owner’s right to use of his property. In the 
instant case we have a restriction on the use of a citizens’ property, not to 
secure a benefit for the public, but to prevent a harm from the change in the 
natural character of the citizens’ property. We start with the premise that lakes 
and rivers in their natural state are unpolluted and the pollution which now 
exists is man made. The state of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty 
to eradicate the present pollution and to prevent further pollution in its 
navigable waters. This is not, in a legal sense, a gain or a securing of a benefit 
by the maintaining of the natural status quo of the environment. What makes 
this case different from most condemnation or police power zoning cases is 
the interrelationship of the wetlands, the swamps and the natural environment 
of shorelands to the purity of the water and to such natural resources as 
navigation, fishing, and scenic beauty. Swamps and wetlands were once 
considered wasteland, undesirable, and not picturesque. But as the people 
became more sophisticated, an appreciation was acquired that swamps and 
	
 84  Id. at 321–22. See also Cnty. of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973). 
 85  Bryson, 243 N.W.2d at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing ALDO LEOPOLD, A 
SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 203 (1949)).  
 86  Id. 
 87  201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). 
 88  Id. at 769. 
 89  Id. at 768. 
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wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are part of the balance of nature and are 
essential to the purity of the water in our lakes and streams. Swamps and 
wetlands are a necessary part of the ecological creation and now, even to the 
uninitiated, possess their own beauty in nature. 
Is the ownership of a parcel of land so absolute that man can change its 
nature to suit any of his purposes? The great forests of our state were stripped 
on the theory man’s ownership was unlimited. But in forestry, the land at least 
was used naturally, only the natural fruit of the land (the trees) were taken. 
The despoilage was in the failure to look to the future and provide for the 
reforestation of the land. An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right 
to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a 
purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the 
rights of others. The exercise of the police power in zoning must be reasonable 
and we think it is not an unreasonable exercise of that power to prevent harm 
to public rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses.90 
Other public trust cases in the early 1970s in California, Illinois, and 
elsewhere expressed similar ideas, reflecting the growing awareness of the 
need to protect natural resources, and the importance of maintaining the 
connection between humans and the natural world, even if that might stand 
in the way of economic development.91 
The sentiments of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bryson continued 
through the decades, albeit with somewhat less urgency, and in more recent 
cases applying MERA, in a similar manner to other states applying the public 
trust doctrine. However, because of the early success by plaintiffs in MERA 
cases, there was no real need in Minnesota to develop a modern common 
law public trust doctrine. MERA provides a clear statute, with an expansive 
definition of natural resources, and a direct path to injunctive relief. Indeed, 
in contrast to the sixty-eight MERA decisions issued by Minnesota appellate 
courts since the law’s enactment in 1971, there are only two appellate 
decisions since 1970 where plaintiffs attempted to use the public trust 
doctrine to protect natural resources, and the Minnesota Supreme Court did 
not review either case.92 In each case, the plaintiff attempted to expand the 
	
 90  Id. at 767–68. See also supra note 37 (discussing a more recent public trust doctrine case 
in Wisconsin). 
 91  See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 378, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the public 
trust doctrine prevented a landowner from filling tidelands, and citing increasing development 
pressures on natural resources, the flexibility of the public trust doctrine to encompass 
changing public needs, and a growing recognition that one of the more important uses of 
tidelands is “preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as 
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food 
and habitat for birds and marine life”); Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 775, 780–81. 
(Ill. 1977) (invalidating state senate bill conveying 200 acres under Lake Michigan to a steel 
company based on the public trust doctrine and stating that “there has developed a strong, 
though belated, interest in conserving natural resources and in protecting and improving our 
physical environment”). 
 92  Larson v. Sando, 508 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Aronow v. State, No. A12–0585, 
2012 WL 4476642 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012). A Westlaw search reveals two other Minnesota 
cases where the term “public trust doctrine” is used, but these did not involve efforts to protect 
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public trust doctrine beyond traditional water-based resources without any 
compelling legal authority supporting the claim and the Minnesota courts 
rejected the efforts. 
In the first case, Larson v. Sando (Larson),93 the Minnesota Department 
of Corrections transferred three parcels of property to the Minnesota 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), which designated the land as a 
state wildlife management area.94 Some time later, DNR proposed to sell the 
land to a window manufacturing company nearby in connection with the 
company’s expansion of its facility.95 Neighboring landowners challenged the 
sale, which the state legislature had approved, on grounds that it violated the 
public trust doctrine.96 In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the case, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals held in 1993 that the public trust doctrine 
applies to state-owned waterways, not land. Citing earlier case law,97 the 
court reasoned “[t]he state owns navigable waters and the lands under them 
for public use, as trustee for the public, and not as a proprietor with right of 
alienation.”98 It contrasted this public trust obligation over navigable waters 
and submerged lands with other lands owned by the state, noting, “if the 
doctrine applied to land, it would prohibit any sale of any state land” and it 
found no support in the law for such a prohibition.99 
The second case, Aronow v. State (Aronow),100 was one of the lawsuits 
that Our Children’s Trust, an Oregon-based nonprofit, filed on behalf of 
children against environmental protection agencies in all fifty states and 
several federal agencies in 2011 alleging that these governmental entities had 
violated the common law public trust doctrine by failing to limit greenhouse 
gas emissions that contribute to climate change.101 In the Minnesota case, the 
trial court granted the state’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed.102 
In affirming the dismissal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held in an 
unpublished opinion that as an intermediate appellate court, it was an error-
correcting court and thus was without authority to change the law.103 It 
reasoned that the plaintiff had provided no legal support for the argument 
that the scope of the public trust doctrine should be expanded to protect the 
atmosphere and the court on its own could find no supporting case law.104 
	
or preserve natural resources. As discussed in Part III.B., infra, there are also several Minnesota 
cases prior to 1970 that involve disputes over lakebed ownership where the courts reference the 
public trust doctrine. 
 93  508 N.W.2d at 782. 
 94  Id. at 783. 
 95  Id. at 784. 
 96  Id. at 784, 787. 
 97  See Pratt v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1981); Nelson v. De Long, 7 
N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 1942). 
 98  Larson, 508 N.W.2d at 787.  
 99  Id. 
 100  No. A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012). 
 101  Id.; Our Children’s Trust, Legal Action, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/Legal (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2015).  
 102  Aronow, 2012 WL 4476642, at *1. 
 103  Id. at *2–3. 
 104  Id. at *2. 
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Thus, the court found no legal basis to expand the public trust doctrine 
beyond its application to navigable waters and submerged lands.105 
Notably, because each of these cases was an attempt to expand the 
scope of the public trust doctrine beyond the resources it traditionally 
protects, one wonders why the plaintiffs in each case did not bring a MERA 
claim rather than a public trust claim. Although each plaintiff likely would 
have had other difficulties establishing liability under MERA, both the land 
and the air are statutorily defined “natural resources” subject to protection 
under the statute, thus providing a much more straightforward vehicle for 
relief than the common law public trust doctrine.106 However, in the case 
attempting to apply the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere, the goal of 
the litigation was to develop the common law doctrine on a nationwide basis 
as a means of supporting efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions.107 A 
similar effort using MERA in Minnesota would not necessarily aid that 
nationwide endeavor. 
B. White Bear Lake Restoration Association v. Minnesota Department of 
Natural Resources 
As illustrated above, Minnesota courts have developed a significant 
body of case law interpreting MERA and virtually no post-1971 case law 
interpreting the scope or application of the public trust doctrine in the state 
apart from the two decisions by Minnesota intermediate appellate courts 
declining to extend the doctrine beyond water-based resources without 
Minnesota Supreme Court case law to support it. Thus, there are few 
appellate decisions in Minnesota addressing how the public trust doctrine 
can be used to protect traditional, water-based resources or balance 
development against natural resource protection.108 Instead, disputes over 
balancing economic development and natural resource protection in the 
context of both water-based resources and other natural resources have all 
been channeled into MERA claims. There are no published cases where a 
plaintiff asserted claims under both MERA and the public trust doctrine, and 
thus no Minnesota decision addressing the interplay between the state’s 
environmental rights statute and the common law public trust doctrine. 
	
 105  Id.  
 106  Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. 116B.02 (West 2014); cf. Herman 
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (noting that, in another statutory context, 
statutory schemes can “rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law 
protections”). 
 107  See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 54, Aronow v. State, 2012 WL 
4476642 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2015) (No. A12-0585) (“Together with the State’s common law 
duty under the Public Trust Doctrine, MERA compels the State of Minnesota . . . to safeguard 
the atmosphere for the future enjoyment of Minnesotans . . . .”). 
 108  See Eastern Comparative Guide, supra note 33, at 71–73 (summarizing Minnesota case 
law); Sherry A. Enzler et al., Finding a Path to Sustainable Water Management: Where We’ve 
Been, Where We Need to Go, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 842, 854–56 (2013) (discussing public 
trust doctrine cases in Minnesota). 
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However, in 2012, in White Bear Lake Restoration Association, two 
plaintiff groups representing businesses and homeowners along the shores 
of White Bear Lake in Ramsey County, Minnesota, approximately ten miles 
northeast of St. Paul, sued the Minnesota DNR asserting claims under both 
MERA and the public trust doctrine for failure to take action to prevent 
declines of water levels in the 2,400-acre lake—one of the largest and 
deepest lakes in the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan area.109 The White 
Bear Lake Restoration Association (Restoration Association) represented 
businesses that used and were dependent on the lake.110 The White Bear 
Lake Homeowners’ Association (Homeowners’ Association) represented 
residents who lived in the area of the lake.111 The Restoration Association 
was the original plaintiff and brought solely MERA claims.112 The 
Homeowners’ Association subsequently intervened in the case supporting 
the existing MERA claims and included a new claim under the common law 
public trust doctrine.113 
The lake supported swimming, boating, waterskiing, fishing, wildlife 
habitat, and various recreational businesses.114 The lake had a small 
watershed, which means there was a limited surface area around the lake 
from which precipitation runoff flowed into the lake.115 The only other water 
source that recharged the lake was groundwater from the underlying Prairie 
du Chien-Jordan aquifer.116 While Minneapolis, St. Paul, and other 
surrounding communities received surface water from the Mississippi River 
to meet their municipal water needs,117 many other municipalities in the 
	
 109  Settlement Agreement, supra note 18, 1–2. See Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., Fisheries 
Lake Survey, White Bear Lake, http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/lakefind/showreport.html? 
downum=82016700 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (providing a description of White Bear Lake); 
Dana Thiede, KARE, Settlement Announced in White Bear Lake Lawsuit, http://www.kare11. 
com/story/news/local/2014/12/01/settlement-announced-in-white-bear-lake-lawsuit/19737955/ 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that White Bear Lake is one of the largest and deepest lakes 
in the Twin Cities metropolitan area). 
 110  Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 25.  
 111  Complaint in Intervention of White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n ¶5, White Bear Lake 
Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (May 2, 2013). 
 112  Settlement Agreement, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
 113  Id. at 2. 
 114  Summary Judgment Order Memorandum, supra note 21, at 8; Complaint in Intervention, 
supra note 111, at 7–8; Intervenor/Plaintiff White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.’s 
Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, White Bear Lake 
Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (April 7, 2014).  
 115  Summary Judgment Order Memorandum, supra note 21, at 3; Complaint in Intervention, 
supra note 111, at 3. 
 116  Summary Judgment Order Memorandum, supra note 21, at 3; Complaint in Intervention, 
supra note 111, at 3–4. 
 117  See City of St. Paul, Minn., Water Service Facts, http://www.stpaul.gov/index 
.aspx?NID=502 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that St. Paul has the capacity to pump 90 
million gallons per day from the Mississippi River); City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Water 
Facts, http://www.minneapolismn.gov/publicworks/water/water_waterfacts (last visited Apr. 17, 
2015) (listing the Mississippi River as the “sole source” of Minneapolis water); Metro. Council, 
St. Paul and White Bear Lake: A Strong Water Supply Match, http://www.metrocouncil 
.org/News-Events/Wastewater-Water/Newsletters/St-Paul-and-White-Bear-Lake-a-strong-water-
supply.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  
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region obtained their water through high-capacity municipal wells drawing 
water from the aquifer pursuant to permits issued by DNR.118 Between 2003 
and 2011, precipitation in the White Bear Lake area was at or near a thirty-
year average, while during that same time period water levels in White Bear 
Lake dropped, as much as five feet, to their lowest recorded level.119 
In 2011, the U.S. Geological Survey conducted a study on the 
relationship between groundwater and surface water near White Bear Lake 
and focused on pumping by ten municipalities in the area of White Bear 
Lake.120 This report found a more than five-foot decline in the water levels of 
White Bear Lake between 2003 and 2010 and concluded that significantly 
increased municipal groundwater withdrawals from the area around the lake 
through high-capacity wells was a significant factor in the decline of water 
levels.121 Despite these reports as well as concerns voiced by residents and 
government agencies over the lake’s continued decline, at the time the 
plaintiffs filed their complaints, DNR had not considered the cumulative 
impact of the groundwater withdrawals on the lake in making decisions 
regarding individual groundwater withdrawal permits, had not set a 
protected elevation for the lake, and had not implemented any other 
procedures to prevent drawdown of the aquifer or otherwise protect the 
lake.122 
In their complaints, the plaintiffs alleged that significant increases in 
water appropriations by high-capacity wells, including high-capacity 
municipal wells, had caused the decrease in lake levels rather than any 
changes in precipitation.123 The plaintiffs also alleged that there were feasible 
and prudent alternatives to continuing to allow increased groundwater 
pumping including: 1) augmenting public water supplies with surface water 
from the St. Paul Regional Water Service and reducing high-capacity water 
appropriations to pre-2000 levels; 2) substantially limiting groundwater 
withdrawals from targeted wells that have the greatest impact on the lake; 3) 
enacting and enforcing heightened water conservation practices in the 
affected area; or 4) augmenting lake levels with water from the Mississippi 
River.124 
Both plaintiffs brought claims under section 116B.03 of MERA, alleging 
that DNR: 1) violated state environmental quality standards by issuing new 
groundwater withdrawal permits, and failing to terminate or modify existing 
permits in the area surrounding the lake; and, 2) engaged in conduct that 
resulted in a material adverse effect on the lake in violation of MERA 
separate and apart from any violation of an environmental quality 
	
 118  Summary Judgment Order, supra note 21, at 3–4; Complaint in Intervention, supra note 
105, at 4–5. 
 119  Summary Judgment Order, supra note 21, at 6–8; Complaint in Intervention, supra note 
111, at 5. 
 120  Summary Judgment Order, supra note 21, at 4. 
 121  Id. at 6–8. 
 122  Id. at 8. 
 123  Complaint in Intervention, supra note 111, at 5. 
 124  Complaint in Intervention, supra note 111, at 8–9. 
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standard.125 The Homeowners’ Association also brought a separate public 
trust doctrine claim, alleging that the state and DNR were trustees of the 
state’s public water resources—including the lake, the water, and the 
lakebed—and that DNR’s actions and inactions had caused the impairment 
and destruction of the lake in breach of their obligations under the public 
trust doctrine.126 
Before the case settled in December 2014, on terms discussed below, 
DNR brought a motion to dismiss the claims and, when the court denied that 
motion, all parties brought motions for summary judgment on various 
claims.127 These motions resulted in two decisions by the Ramsey County 
District Court.128 Because the focus of this Article is on the public trust 
doctrine, the parties’ arguments and the court’s decisions on the MERA 
claims will not be discussed except as they relate to the public trust doctrine 
claim. 
In its motion to dismiss the public trust doctrine claim, DNR argued 
first that the Homeowners’ Association was attempting to expand the 
doctrine to cover groundwater and cited the Larson and Aronow cases to 
show that Minnesota courts had rejected efforts to expand the doctrine to 
include additional resources beyond navigable waterways and their beds.129 
DNR then argued that the Homeowners’ Association could not bring a public 
trust doctrine claim to protect the lake when the challenged action was 
providing domestic water, which is a public use also protected by the public 
trust doctrine.130 In other words, so long as public trust assets are used for a 
public good—here domestic consumption—there cannot be a public trust 
doctrine violation.131 DNR relied on a 1947 Minnesota case, State v. Longyear 
Holding Co. (Longyear),132 where the state sought to establish its rights of 
ownership to the ore below the low water mark of a lake and to establish 
that riparian owners had no interest in those minerals so the state could 
drain the lake and mine the ore.133 The court in Longyear held that the state 
owned the bed of the lake, the temporary draining did not operate to 
transfer title to the riparian owners, and mining the ore was in the interest of 
	
 125  Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 2, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-
2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 11, 2013).  
 126  Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, supra note 125, at 11–13. 
 127  Id.; Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, ex 
rel. State of Minn.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-
CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 2014); Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motions 
to Dismiss, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 18, 
2013).  
 128  Motion to Dismiss Order, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. June 18, 2013); Motion to Dismiss Order, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-
CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 2013).  
 129  Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motions to Dismiss, supra note 127, at  
28–29.  
 130  Id. at 29. 
 131  Id. at 29–30. 
 132  Id. at 30; 29 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1947). 
 133  Longyear, 29 N.W.2d at 661, 662. 
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the public and did not violate the public trust doctrine.134 Thus, according to 
DNR, the public trust doctrine operated solely as “a real estate doctrine” that 
limits the state’s ability to transfer or dispose of beds of navigable waters.135 
DNR bolstered its arguments with reference to Minnesota water statutes, 
which stated that domestic consumption is a high priority use of water but 
did not specify any priority of maintaining lake elevations.136 Thus, these 
legislative declarations displaced any common law public trust doctrine 
protections.137 
In response, the Homeowners’ Association argued that the public trust 
doctrine was an independent check on legislative priorities for public trust 
resources.138 The Homeowners’ Association also relied on modern 
environmental protection statutes in Minnesota and the development of the 
public trust doctrine in other states to argue that the public trust doctrine in 
Minnesota was not frozen in time in 1947, but instead had expanded to 
include modern environmental protection priorities reflected in state 
statutes as well as public trust doctrine developments elsewhere in the 
country.139 It further contended that statutes in Minnesota as well as 
environmental science undermined DNR’s efforts to deny the connection 
between surface water and groundwater, and that DNR’s actions with regard 
to groundwater withdrawals were what was causing the destruction of the 
lake itself—a protected public trust resource—resulting in a breach of the 
state’s duty to protect that resource under the doctrine.140 
The district court denied DNR’s motion to dismiss the public trust 
doctrine claim.141 It found that the “relationship between lake levels and the 
aquifer are inexorably entwined” and thus the public trust doctrine claim 
easily encompassed established public trust resources including the lake, its 
use as a navigable waterway, and the impacts of the depletion of the lake on 
fish and wildlife.142 The court also found, citing Illinois Central, that the 
public trust doctrine “serves as a check upon legislative and regulatory 
actions involving assets held in public trust.”143 Finally, the court, citing to 
MERA’s savings clause, stated that MERA and other environmental 
protection legislation have “reinforced the public trust concept, but have not 
supplanted it.”144 The court also rejected DNR’s argument that there could be 
no public trust violation if the water was used for domestic, and thus public, 
purposes and found that the complaint properly alleged that DNR had failed 
	
 134  Id. at 665, 667, 670. 
 135  Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motions to Dismiss at 14, White Bear 
Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 11, 2013). 
 136  Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motions to Dismiss, supra note 127, at 30. 
 137  Id. at 30–31. 
 138  Intervenor’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4, White 
Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 3, 2013).  
 139  Id. at 11–13. 
 140  Id. at 10–11, 14–16. 
 141  Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, supra note 125, at 2. 
 142  Id. at 11. 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. at 12. 
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in its duty as trustee of a public asset—the lake—in granting excessive water 
withdrawal permits and could pursue that claim.145 
After significant discovery, all parties moved for summary judgment on 
various aspects of the MERA and public trust doctrine claims.146 On the 
public trust doctrine claim, DNR argued first that there was no evidence the 
lake was used for commerce or was otherwise navigable at the time of 
statehood in 1858 and thus it was not owned by the state or protected under 
the public trust doctrine.147 DNR also argued that the public trust doctrine 
did not provide an affirmative cause of action in Minnesota and that “[n]o 
Minnesota court has held that an affirmative cause of action is implied in the 
public trust doctrine.”148 DNR argued that the Homeowners’ Association 
could not rely on both MERA and the public trust doctrine and that “if the 
Homeowners’ Association is relying on MERA for jurisdiction, its public 
trust doctrine ‘claim’ must be dismissed.”149 It argued, in addition, that courts 
in Minnesota had not expanded the doctrine to include groundwater and 
Minnesota courts “have repeatedly declined to expand the public trust 
doctrine,” citing Aronow, Larson, and Longyear.150 Finally, DNR argued that 
even if it owned the bed of the lake, Minnesota’s public trust doctrine did not 
impose any obligation on the state to manage navigable waters over the 
lakebed to protect public trust uses.151 Instead, the doctrine only protects 
trust uses by imposing a “limitation on the State’s ability to transfer or 
dispose of the beds of navigable waters.”152 Throughout its briefs, DNR stated 
again and again that there was no Minnesota case law to support even the 
	
 145  See id. at 12–13 (“[The claim] addresses the public interest in protecting White Bear lake 
as well as the association members’ riparian rights . . . .”). 
 146  Summary Judgment Order Memorandum, supra note 21, at 2. 
 147  See Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 22–23 (arguing that the intervenors needed to show that 
the “lake was used, or was susceptible of being used . . . as a highway for commerce”). 
 148  Id. at 23. 
 149  Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 20, at 17. 
 150  Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 20, at 24–25 (citing Aronow v. State, A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *2 
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012); Larson v. Sando, 508 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)); Minn. 
Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
supra note 20, at 19–20 (citing State v. Longyear Holding Co., 29 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Minn. 1947); 
Larson, 508 N.W.2d at 787); Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Memorandum Opposing White Bear 
Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3–6, White Bear Lake 
Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014) (citing Longyear, 29 N.W.2d 
at 669 and Larson, 508 N.W.2d at 787). 
 151  See Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 18–19, 24 (explaining that regardless of DNR’s limited 
authority in comparison to a landowner, the Minnesota “public trust doctrine is essentially a 
real estate doctrine that operates as a limitation on the State’s ability to transfer or dispose of 
the beds of navigable waters”).  
 152  Id. at 24. 
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most basic application of the public trust doctrine to protect any water 
resources or limit DNR’s actions with regard to those water resources.153 
In its own motion for summary judgment, the Homeowners’ Association 
provided evidence establishing that the lake was navigable at the time of 
statehood because it was susceptible for use in travel and commercial 
navigation at and before that time.154 Original surveys of the lake showed it 
as a meandered lake approximately the same size as existed when 
steamboats began to be used on the lake in the late 1800s and a tourist 
industry developed around the lake.155 The Homeowners’ Association argued 
that DNR had an affirmative duty to consider and balance any negative 
impact of its actions on the lake under the public trust doctrine even though 
Minnesota courts had not directly addressed the issue.156 It also argued that 
the facts were undisputed that DNR’s actions had impacted lake levels, 
threatened the public trust interests in the lake, and thus violated the public 
trust doctrine.157 
In its order on summary judgment in 2014, the court denied the bulk of 
the parties’ motions on MERA and the public trust doctrine on grounds that 
there were material facts in dispute regarding the impact of groundwater 
pumping on lake levels; pollution, impairment, or destruction of natural 
resources associated with the lake; the diligence of DNR in protecting those 
resources; whether DNR violated environmental standards in issuing the 
groundwater appropriation permits; and the appropriate remedy.158 However, 
the court did grant in part the Homeowners’ Association motion for 
summary judgment on the public trust doctrine.159 The court found there was 
sufficient evidence to establish that the lake was navigable-in-fact at the time 
of statehood and that the public trust doctrine imposed an obligation on 
DNR to protect and preserve not only the bed of the lake but also its surface 
waters.160 Thus, the court granted summary judgment for the Homeowners’ 
Association on “the question of whether the public trust doctrine affords a 
common law cause of action to protect the public’s use rights to the water 
and lakebed of White Bear Lake.”161 Nevertheless, the court denied summary 
judgment based on disputes of fact regarding whether DNR’s management of 
	
 153  See id.; Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 19–20; Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Memorandum 
Opposing White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra 
note 150 at 3–6. 
 154  Intervenor/Plaintiff White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.’s Memorandum in Support 
of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 114, at 9, 21. 
 155  Id. at 21–22. 
 156  Id. at 25. 
 157  Intervenor/Plaintiff White Bear Lake Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.’s Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-
CV-13-2414 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 1, 2014). 
 158  Summary Judgment Order Memorandum, supra note 21, at 6–12. 
 159  Id. at 12. 
 160  Id. at 13–15. 
 161  Id. at 16. 
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the resource and management of groundwater appropriation permits in fact 
violated its fiduciary duty under the public trust doctrine.162 
Then, in December 2014, the parties reached a settlement that would 
stay the litigation for three years while they attempted to develop an area-
wide solution to water management.163 Under the agreement, DNR and the 
city of White Bear Lake would support a plan to develop a surface water 
supply for cities around the lake.164 During the first phase, six municipalities 
would receive surface water at a cost of $155 million to $230 million.165 “The 
DNR would support legislation to fund feasibility and design considerations 
by August 2016, with the target for full construction funding in 2017.”166 In a 
second phase, seven other municipalities would move to using surface 
water.167 “The DNR would determine and set a ‘protective elevation’ for 
White Bear Lake by November 1, 2016.”168 This elevation would not be 
required until the first phase of the water-supply project was complete, at 
which time it could be used to regulate new groundwater permits.169 DNR 
and the two plaintiff groups would work to persuade residents to reduce 
water use with an overall goal of a 17% reduction.170 As part of the 
agreement, DNR did not admit that the primary cause of the drop in the 
lake’s water level was associated with groundwater pumping.171 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW IN THE SHADOW OF STATUTES 
The question in this Part is whether there are any broad lessons to be 
learned from the public trust doctrine experience in Minnesota. On the one 
hand, Professor Sax’s vision for the public trust doctrine created the 
momentum to enact a unique and powerful environmental rights statute in 
Minnesota. Plaintiffs have used the statute effectively and very successfully 
for forty years to protect natural resources and create a substantive role for 
the courts in reviewing both public and private development projects that 
	
 162  Id. 
 163  See Stipulation for Stay, White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, No. 62-CV-13-2414 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Dec. 16, 2014).  
 164  Jim Anderson, White Bear Lake Settlement Pushes Plan to Divert Water from Mississippi, 
STAR TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 2014, http://www.startribune.com/local/east/284350031.html (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2015); Debra O’Connor, White Bear Lake Agreement Would Pump Mississippi Water to 
13 Suburbs, PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 1, 2014, http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_27043916 
/white-bear-lake-groups-settle-dnr-over-water (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); Elizabeth Dunbar, 
White Bear Lake Settlement Hinges on Legislature, MPR NEWS, Dec. 1, 2014, 
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/12/01/wbl-water-levels (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); Mark 
Wolski, Minnesota, White Bear Lake Settle Lawsuit Over Lake’s Decreasing Water Levels, 232 
DAILY ENVT. REP. Dec. 3, 2014, http://news.bna.com/deln/DELNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid 
=59855728&vname=dennotallissues&jd=a0f9u1p7y3&split=0 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 165  O’Connor, supra note 164. 
 166  Id. 
 167  Id. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. 
 171  Id. 
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would impact natural resources well beyond what could be accomplished 
solely with environmental review laws such as the National Environmental 
Policy Act172 or, Minnesota’s version, the Minnesota Environmental Policy 
Act,173 which provide only procedural and not substantive remedies. 
Moreover, MERA’s broad definition of “natural resources” means plaintiffs 
do not need to convince courts to expand the resources protected by the 
public trust doctrine beyond traditional navigable waters and submerged 
lands. The statute clearly encompasses a broad range of natural resources 
including land, air, animals, wildlife habitat, historic buildings, and aesthetic 
resources. 
Nevertheless, has Minnesota lost anything because litigants in the state 
have channeled all their natural resource protection litigation through 
MERA, essentially leaving the public trust doctrine in its pre-1971 condition? 
There are good arguments that it has. Indeed, in many areas of 
environmental law, common law and statutes can work and have worked 
together cooperatively in a manner that allows one to enhance the other for 
environmental protection purposes.174 For instance, there is strong evidence 
that courts began to more frequently apply common law strict liability to 
actions causing environmental harm on land after Congress enacted the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980 (CERCLA).175 One explanation for this shift is that courts had 
become comfortable applying the statutory strict liability provisions in 
CERCLA to environmental contamination cases. Thus, it was only a small 
step to apply strict liability to environmental contamination cases that 
involved common law claims as well as CERCLA claims and find that 
activities resulting in environmental contamination were “abnormally 
dangerous,” justifying common law strict liability.176 These cases, moreover, 
were decided at a time when courts were otherwise refusing to expand the 
boundaries of activities considered “abnormally dangerous” under strict 
liability to new activities, choosing instead to require plaintiffs to prove 
negligence.177 
However, CERCLA was able to impact the development of common law 
because litigants continue to need the common law to obtain monetary 
	
 172  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012). 
 173  Minnesota Environmental Policy Act of 1973, Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 116D.01–.07 (West 
2014). 
 174  See Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on 
Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 961–62 (2004) 
[hereinafter Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation] (suggesting that courts have expanded 
application of common law strict liability in environmental contamination cases based on the 
policies, principles, and legislative history of statutes like CERCLA that apply strict liability in 
similar factual circumstances); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of 
the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 547 (2007) [hereinafter Klass, Common Law and 
Federalism]. 
 175  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). 
 176  Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation, supra note 174, at 957–58, 961. 
 177  Id. at 934–35, 961. 
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damages in contamination cases along with equitable CERCLA relief.178 In 
other words, plaintiffs could not rely just on CERCLA if they sought to 
recover diminution in value to property, lost profits, or punitive damages in 
addition to the cleanup costs they could recover under CERCLA. As a result, 
plaintiffs frequently brought the two sets of claims together,179 thus allowing 
common law doctrine to develop alongside CERCLA. 
The same is true with the relationship between nuisance lawsuits and 
the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. Certainly, after the enactment of 
these powerful statutes in the 1970s, plaintiffs filed fewer nuisance lawsuits 
to resolve air and water pollution cases.180 Nevertheless, there were still 
cases where plaintiffs sought to recover monetary damages associated with 
such pollution, and thus courts were in a position to consider these common 
law claims against the backdrop of Congress’s new policy pronouncements 
on clean air and clean water.181 And, of course, when concerns about climate 
change rose to prominence after 2000, private plaintiffs once again looked to 
nuisance law as a major legal tool because the existing federal 
environmental statutes were not readily available for private litigation even 
if they were able to serve as a basis for EPA regulation.182 
In contrast to other areas of environmental law where statutes and 
common law can work together to provide complementary remedies and 
where common law can fill in the holes in the statutes, with MERA, why ever 
bring a public trust doctrine case? Only injunctive relief is available under 
either the common law or MERA, so common law in this instance doesn’t 
provide any additional remedy.183 Looking back with a perspective of forty 
years, this reliance on MERA means that the common law never developed 
in Minnesota. Notably, unlike nuisance law, which has a long history of 
being used for environmental protection purposes, the public trust doctrine 
has been used for environmental protection purposes across the country 
only since the time MERA was enacted in 1970,184 so there was no earlier 
case law to draw on like the situation with nuisance in the air and water 
context or nuisance, trespass, and strict liability in the land contamination 
context. 
Does it matter? It does. As powerful as it is, MERA does have 
limitations not found in the public trust doctrine. MERA suits cannot be 
brought against private parties or local governments acting under a state 
permit.185 There are statutory affirmative defenses that may not exist in the 
	
 178  Id. at 905. 
 179  See id. at 905, 946 (“Thus, claims for common law strict liability remain a crucial element 
of a plaintiff’s case, even if a statutory cause of action exists under state law, federal law, or 
both.”). 
 180  See, e.g., Klass, Common Law and Federalism, supra note 174, at 574 (describing the 
decline of the use of state common law claims to recover for environmental harm in favor of 
greater reliance on the new federal statutes enacted in the 1970s and 1980s). 
 181  Klass, Common Law and Federalism, supra note 174, at 583–84. 
 182  Id. 
 183  See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 184  See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 185  See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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common law.186 Moreover, state legislatures can and do amend statutes to 
make them less protective of natural resources and the environment. There 
is no guarantee that the Minnesota legislature will not at some point amend 
MERA to limit its ability to protect natural resources. The same is true for 
executive branch administrative agencies. Courts must give deference under 
administrative law principles to agencies interpreting statutes and 
regulations187 and that deference may result in reduced protection for natural 
resources. But the public trust doctrine is a vehicle for the courts to ensure 
that the state fulfills its common law obligation to protect natural resources 
even if legislative and executive branch sentiments are otherwise. 
Most important, MERA can only be used offensively to stop private or 
government action that may adversely impact natural resources.188 MERA 
cannot be used to defend government action to protect the environment in 
the face of private party challenges such as regulatory takings claims. The 
public trust doctrine, however, can be used and has frequently been used 
defensively by the government to support its efforts to protect the 
environment. There are numerous examples in states including Louisiana, 
Hawaii, California, Washington, Virginia, Wisconsin, New York, and Ohio 
where state courts upheld state actions to protect or preserve wetlands, 
lakes, groundwater, coastal areas, and other protected public trust resources 
from claims by developers and private landowners that the state action was 
arbitrary and capricious or resulted in a taking of private property without 
just compensation.189 In each case, the court, using the public trust doctrine 
on its own or in combination with state environmental protection statutes, 
upheld the state action on grounds that the state was required to or at least 
permitted to take such action to preserve public trust resources.190 
	
 186  See, e.g., Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02, subdiv. 2 
(West 2014) (excluding family farms and family farm corporations from entities subject to suit 
under MERA); id. § 116B.03, subdiv. 1 (excluding MERA actions against people acting pursuant 
to a permit or license issued by specified state agencies); id. § 116B.04 (stating that a defendant 
may rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case by showing no feasible or prudent alternative to the 
proposed conduct).   
 187  See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
 188  See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116B.03 (providing for a civil action to protect natural resources 
from pollution, impairment, or destruction, but providing no mechanism for governments to use 
the statute as a defense when their efforts to preserve natural resources interfere with private 
property rights). 
 189  Klass, supra note 9, at 734–42 (discussing cases where courts found state or local action 
to deny a permit or to take action was either not a taking or not arbitrary and capricious). See 
also Melissa K. Scanlan, Shifting Sands: A Meta-Theory for Public Access and Private Property 
Along the Coast, 65 S.C. L. REV. 295, 350–53 (2013) (discussing role of the public trust doctrine 
in takings claims); see generally Robin Kundis Craig, What the Public Trust Doctrine Can Teach 
Us About the Police Power, Penn Central, and the Public Interest in Natural Resource 
Regulation (forthcoming 2015) (discussing role of the public trust doctrine in regulatory takings 
cases). 
 190  See generally Klass, supra note 9, at 734–37, 741 (discussing cases upholding government 
actions to prevent private development that would adversely impact protected resources and 
rejecting arguments by plaintiffs that such government actions were arbitrary and capricious or 
constituted a taking). 
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It is this role for the public trust doctrine that makes DNR’s position in 
the White Bear Lake Restoration Association case so troubling. Certainly, in 
that case, a broad reading of the public trust doctrine was against DNR’s 
short-term interests in retaining maximum flexibility to make water 
allocation decisions. However, by arguing for an extremely narrow view of 
the public trust doctrine, DNR was potentially harming its long-term 
interests to the extent it might wish in the future to protect a wetland, 
natural area, lake, or other natural resources from private development or 
appropriation. DNR’s arguments that the public trust doctrine is merely a 
“real estate doctrine” that has no role in natural resources protection may 
not be helpful in future cases where it denies a development permit to 
preserve a wetland or undertakes comprehensive regulation of the state’s 
resources in a manner that impacts private property rights. 
DNR was indeed correct in its briefs in the litigation that there was no 
Minnesota case law declaring citizens can sue under the public trust 
doctrine to protect natural resources, that groundwater is protected, or for 
any other aspect of the public trust doctrine that supported the plaintiffs’ 
claims in the case.191 That is because there is very little Minnesota case law 
on the topic at all. The Ramsey County District Court decisions are a good 
start, and the strong savings clause in MERA itself is extremely helpful,192 but 
if the case settlement remains in effect, there will continue to be no 
controlling authority in the state on the ability to use the public trust 
doctrine to protect natural resources as opposed to it being merely a real 
estate doctrine. 
In a 1986 article on the public trust doctrine, Professor Richard Lazarus 
warned environmental protection advocates and scholars not to place too 
much emphasis on the public trust doctrine lest it undermine efforts to 
create new natural resource protection frameworks through legislative and 
regulatory action.193 But this warning is also valid in reverse. Statutes are 
great. Except when they’re not. There are affirmative defenses in MERA.194 It 
cannot be used for actions on agricultural lands.195 MERA litigation is 
	
 191  See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motions to Dismiss, supra note 127, at 
28–31; Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motions to Dismiss, supra note 135, 
at 10–11, 14; Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. Memorandum Opposing White Bear Lake Homeowners’ 
Ass’n, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 3–6; Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res. 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 16, 19. 
 192  See Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.12 (West 2014) (“No 
existing civil or criminal remedy for any wrongful action shall be excluded or impaired by 
sections 116B.01 to 116B.13. The rights and remedies provided herein shall be in addition to any 
administrative, regulatory, statutory, or common law rights and remedies now or hereafter 
available.”).  
 193  Lazarus, supra note 25, at 657–58, 692. 
 194  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02, subdiv. 2 (excluding family farms and family farm 
corporations from entities subject to suit under MERA); id. § 116B.03, subdiv. 1 (excluding 
MERA actions against persons acting pursuant to a permit or license issued by specified state 
agencies); id. § 116B.04 (stating that a defendant may rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case by 
showing no feasible or prudent alternative to the proposed conduct). 
 195  Id. § 116B.03.  
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expensive.196 It does not allow for recovery of attorneys’ fees and plaintiffs 
will almost always need expensive experts to withstand summary judgment 
and prevail at trial.197 More important, however, there are few reasons to be 
optimistic about legislative sources of environmental protection in today’s 
current political climate. At least at the federal level, the legislative scene 
looks quite different today in 2014 than it did in 1986 when Professor 
Lazarus wrote his article. In the late 1980s and even through much of the 
1990s, many environmental protection issues were bipartisan in nature.198 
Congress enacted significant amendments to the Clean Air Act and 
CERCLA,199 and climate change had not yet become the politically polarizing 
issue it is today. Likewise, many state legislatures continued to enact 
significant environmental protection legislation,200 renewable portfolio 
standards,201 and energy efficiency legislation202 even up until a few years ago. 
At the present moment, however, much of that legislative effort is stalled203 
and a vibrant common law, even an old doctrine like the public trust 
doctrine, may be of use, at least for a time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article explores the relationship between state environmental 
rights statutes and the common law public trust doctrine to consider 
whether there remains a role for the common law to protect natural 
resources even in states where strong environmental rights statutes exist. 
Environmental rights statutes and the common law public trust doctrine can 
and should work together to protect natural resources. The Minnesota 
	
 196  Michael Wietecki, True Access to the Courts for Citizens Working to Protect Natural 
Resources: Incorporating Attorney’s Fees into the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 14 MO. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 149 (2006) (asserting that the cost of litigation is prohibitive due to 
the absence of a provision allowing plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees). 
 197  Id. at 148.  
 198  Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law at the Crossroads: Looking Back 25, Looking 
Forward 25, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 267, 268 (2013).  
 199  Id. at 270–72. 
 200  See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 4, at 583 (summarizing state environmental legislation in the 
1980s and 1990s). 
 201  Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is There a “Race” and Is it to the 
“Top”?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. OF CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 3 (2011–12) (discussing rapid enactment of state 
renewable portfolio standard); see also Database of State Incentives for Renewables and 
Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, available at http://ncsolarcen-
prod.s3.amazonaws 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/RPS_map.pdf (map showing renewable portfolio standards in 
the states). 
 202  See Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, Energy Efficiency 
Resource Standards, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/maps (interactive map 
showing energy efficiency resource standards in the states). 
 203  See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Introduction: Environmental Law Without Congress, 46 J. LAND 
USE & ENVT’L L. 1 (Sept./Oct. 2014) (describing Congress’s failure to address current 
environmental problems); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE 
LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (Yale U. Press 2013) (describing recent attacks on environmental and 
public health laws). 
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example of MERA illustrates that MERA is a powerful statute that has 
played an important role in natural resources protection in the state for over 
forty years. Hopefully MERA will continue to play that role long into the 
future. But during those same forty years, litigants in Minnesota have 
ignored the public trust doctrine in a way that is harmful to environmental 
protection in the state. Because of the lack of developed public trust 
doctrine case law, there are potentially fewer tools available to protect 
natural resources, even traditional public trust resources like navigable 
waters. This is particularly true in cases where MERA’s application may be 
limited or where the state wishes to protect such resources and can use the 
common law public trust doctrine as a shield against regulatory takings 
claims. The White Bear Lake Restoration Association case provides a good 
example of how litigants can use the public trust doctrine in conjunction 
with MERA to protect natural resources. Hopefully future plaintiffs will 
encourage courts in Minnesota and elsewhere to develop a more robust 
common law public trust doctrine to support existing environmental 
protection statutes and regulations. 
